A behavior model of an industrial firm with a possibility of merchandising and purchasing of production on two channels, traditional and commercial, is given. The former is stable, but less profitable due to non-payments. The latter is profitable, but risky. The model describes different modes of firm operation depending on economic parameters. In such a model, firms have incentives to integrate in financial and industrial groups.
INTRODUCTION
The relatively stable state of the Russian economy in 1995-1998 looks somewhat strange from the point of view of mainstream economic theory. The state is characterized by permanent, but not rapid, decrease in production, the coexistence of several types of money, unusual functions of banks in conditions of lack of investments, and low profitability of production (Guriev and Pospelov, 1997) .
In the present paper, we offer a description of the activity of a firm which attempts to promote its production in the market, but often fails and even when successful, bears substantial transaction costs. This results in serious problems with the working capital of the firm. When such firms form a majority, they could try to solve their problems by an inter-firm market with special prices. The model logically includes the non-payments and promissory notes circulation as special types of money. The model also 305 displays the essential role of fixed costs and also explains the tendency for spontaneous integration of firms under the aegis of banks in a certain similarity to financial-industrial groups (FIGs). The model, such a FIG, is the kernel of the model of regional economy explained by Avtukhovich et al. (1999) . The problem of the non-payments is the center of attention for Russian and Western economists who are interested in transition economy appearance. The scales and reasons of origin of the non-payments are considered by Shmelev (1997) and Smirnov (1997) . In Nonpayments in Russian Economy (1998) , the case study of debts is carried out from the point of view of the financial state of a firm. In Klepach (1997) , the possibility of struggle with the non-payments is considered through implantation of a system of circulation of promissory notes. It is also necessary to note Makarov and Leiner (1997) , who consider the role of barter in modern Russian economy. From the point of view adopted here, barter and the non-In the present work, we do not consider a general equilibrium model, parsing behavior of a firm with a system of non-payments. However at the end of the work, we show some reasons why, on the basis of the offered model, it is possible to construct model of a macro-economic equilibrium with the non-payments. Besides, we pay special attention to an economy with fixed costs and show that in this case, a system with the non-payments is more preferable.
MODEL OF INDUSTRIAL FIRM WITH TWO CHANNELS OF DELIVERING
Let us consider an industrial firm producing homogeneous goods. As the factors of production, we shall take into account only material working capitals (raw material and components 
.) Our main supposition is that the firm has two channels to purchase raw material and to deliver output. The first channel we will refer to as "traditional", the second as "commercial".
1. The traditional channel corresponds to delivery by the direct inter-firm links, according to the firm's specialization in the Soviet economy. Investigative data (Dologopyatova, 1995; Yakovlev, 1996) show that direct links cover about 75-85% of delivery. To the traditional channel, we also refer delivering production to the government. We assume that the traditional channel is characterized by the following properties.
The delivery by direct links is stable: the firm can choose levels of delivery and purchasing on the traditional channel, but once chosen, these levels should be maintained long enough (always within the framework of the model).
Delivery and purchasing on direct links allow and even estimate the non-payments.
As in Pospelov (1995) Debt servicing is consists of interest payments and return of previous credits, so the debts to the bank are paid off, at least partially. The dynamics of the firm's debt to the bank depend on the received mode of extra charge of interest rate and are outside the scope of this work. We simply assume as in Guriev and Pospelov (1997) Besides that, we demand that in a state 0 the firm fulfils its obligations on direct links with probability 1.
Since the state 0 may be prolonged without restriction, the necessary and sufficient conditions of fulfilling obligations are the following inequalities.
While labor is not a limiting factor of production and the investments are practically negligible, the subdivision of gross income on profit, wage bill and amortization does not influence the choice of optimum firm policy. So we assume that the firm is interested in gross income. In our model, the gross income is stochastic. As in Guriev and Pospelov (1997) (2) (12) We have assumed that the firm maximizes gross income at the given interest rate r. Let us compare this problem with the problem in which the firm has no possibility of having credit, i.e. when K 0 and the liquidity constraint Eq. (9) looks like
The problem in Eq. (11), subject to Eqs. (4)- (8) and (9), also has a unique solution. Let )t be the Lagrange multiplier removing liquidity constraint in the problem without credit. It is easy to show (see (K 0) . For this reason, the bank will certainly not set its interest rate higher than r*. Therefore, we will further solve the problem of behavior of the firm only at r[0,r].
Further, it will be convenient to include the solvency constraint Eq. (8) (4)- (7), (9) and (10) (4)- (7), (9) and (10) (4)- (7) and (9), where s (q -pl)(l + r(l-')) + 19" $2 (q2 -P2)(/+ r(1--)) + {9*pzp; are the effective prices of delivery and purchasing through the traditional channel, 0* is the equilibrium rate of non-payments inside the given FIG.
NON-PAYMENTS AND INTEGRATION OF FIRMS
In any case--whether by organization of the local market or by reallocation of quotas--the manager of the market (central company or bank) is necessary for the FIG. The most natural mode of reallocation of debts is the well-known financial procedure of rediscount of promissory notes by the bank, which consists of the following. The firm wishing to sell for money debt receivable, first interchanges it for the banking promissory note, which is bought by another firm (in practice, it more often is the buyer of production of the debtors). The sense of this procedure is that the banking promissory note is ensured by assets of the bank, instead of the chain of mutual nonpayments. The functions of the bank are to test and to satisfy by promissory note the actual solvency of debtor.
Actually for services in such an organization of mutually advantageous agreements, the intermediaries (in particular, the banks) raise a particular bill discount. In the model, we neglect it and assume that bank operates disinterestedly.
We speak above only of solvency constraints as in Eq. (8) . Reallocations of financial flows within the FIG can also soften liquidity constraints as in Eq. (9).
As it was shown in Guriev and Pospelov (1997) Here parameter tl is defined by the following algorithm; if at t s the above relations give the values such that Z + xv xc > 0, then put tl sl, else find tl < sl so that Z + xT xc O.
Proposition 2 shows that the model qualitatively allows different policies of the firm. Case 1 describes the firm inside which both channels are mixed with each other. Produced goods are delivered through both channels, but all raw materials are purchased through the traditional channel only.
Case 2 corresponds to the firm using the traditional channel exclusively. Case 3 describes the firm inside which market and traditional structures coexist but are not mixed. Part of the goods directed through the traditional channel are made with raw materials purchased through the traditional channel. Part of the goods directed through the commercial channel are made with raw materials purchased for money at the market.
Investigation of the principals of firms shows that in modern Russian economy all three modes of policy are presented, but the most typical is case 1. Case 1 also is symmetric concerning relations of the prices si/qi, 1,2. It is possible to imagine a model economy in which all firms operate as in Case 1, delivering one part of production to each other through the traditional channel, and the other part through the commercial channel in the consumer market.
